Public Economics and Public Choice Contributions in Honor of Charles B. Blankart
Title:
Public Economics and Public Choice Contributions in Honor of Charles B. Blankart
Author:
Baake, Pio. editor.
ISBN:
9783540727828
Physical Description:
XII, 280 p. online resource.
Contents:
Rights and Wrongs -- Public Choice and New Institutional Economics -- The Machiavelli Program and the Dirty Hands Problem -- Esteem, Norms of Participation and Public Goods Supply -- Fairness, Rights, and Language Rights: On the Fair Treatment of Linguistic Minorities -- Fiscal Federalism, Decentralization and Economic Growth -- Government Bankruptcy and Inflation -- Political Support for Tax Complexity: A Simple Model -- Does the Shadow Economy Pose a Challenge to Economic and Public Finance Policy? - Some Preliminary Findings -- The Rankings and Evaluations Mania -- University Education as Welfare? -- The Economics of Environmental Liability Law — A Dynamic View -- On the Efficiency of a Public Insurance Monopoly: The Case of Housing Insurance in Switzerland -- A Note on David Hansemann as a Precursor of Chadwick and Demsetz -- ‘Stepping Stones’ and ‘Access Holidays’: The Fallacies of Regulatory Micro-Management.
Abstract:
This volume collects essays in honor of Charles Beat Blankart on the oc- th sion of his 65 birthday. Blankart's research is mainly in the area of public finance and public choice. He is also known for his interest in real world problems and intellectual curiosity. These features seem to be well c- veyed by the contributions. Born in Switzerland, Blankart completed his Ph. D. in Basel before moving to Germany. The typically Swiss perspective on individual freedom, h- ever, has remained with him. Blankart has taught at the Free University of Berlin, the University of the Federal Armed Forces in Munich, Technical University and Humboldt University in Berlin. Throughout his prof- sional positions, Blankart has contributed to various fields, including p- lic finance, public choice, federalism and industrial organization and re- lation. He has left significant marks in these fields, emphasizing throughout how incentives shape the behaviour of individuals, be it in markets or in government. For example, his best selling textbook - fentliche Finanzen in der Demokratie, is unique in bringing a unified p- spective to the study of public finance, treating politicians as ordinary self interested individuals and doing largely away with the benevolent welfare maximizing social planner.
Added Corporate Author:
Electronic Access:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-72782-8