Cover image for The Myth of the Closed Mind : Understanding Why and How People Are Rational.
The Myth of the Closed Mind : Understanding Why and How People Are Rational.
Title:
The Myth of the Closed Mind : Understanding Why and How People Are Rational.
Author:
Percival, Ray Scott.
ISBN:
9780812697957
Personal Author:
Physical Description:
1 online resource (247 pages)
Contents:
Brief Table of Contents -- Detailed Table of Contents -- Preface -- Prologue: People Are Rational -- My Outrageous Idea -- The Main Arguments for the Closed Mind -- ARGUMENT #1. EMOTION -- REBUTTAL -- ARGUMENT #2. WISHFUL THINKING -- REBUTTAL -- ARGUMENT #3. LINGUISTIC OR CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORKS -- REBUTTAL -- ARGUMENT # 4. IMMUNIZING STRATAGEMS -- REBUTTAL -- ARGUMENT # 5. PROTECTIVE SHELL AND ESSENTIAL CORE -- REBUTTAL -- ARGUMENT #6. BLIND FAITH -- REBUTTAL -- ARGUMENT # 7. PEOPLE ARE ILLOGICAL WHEN TESTING THEIR BELIEFS -- REBUTTAL -- ARGUMENT 8. MIND-VIRUSES -- REBUTTAL -- ARGUMENT # 9. DUMB DECISION RULES -- REBUTTAL -- Ghostly Logic -- The Orthodoxy -- The Turnover of Adherents -- My Sense of 'Rational' -- What Would an Irrational Human Look Like? -- Terrorism and Emotion -- The Problem -- My General Position. -- The Logic in Ideology -- Why Dawkins's Memetic ApproachIs Not Enough -- Is My Argument Open to Argument? -- The Examples of Marxism and Freudianism -- [ 1 ] The Persuader's Predicament -- Trading Off Closedness for Spreadability -- NARROW CURIOSITY OR GENERALWONDER? -- Truth Is an Advantage in Propaganda -- The Struggle for Coherence in Abrahamic Religions -- MONOD ON PERFORMANCE UNRELATED TO TRUTH -- GELLNER ON BURNING FAITH UNRELATED TO TRUTH -- Christianity Modified by Competition from Science -- The Persuasive Power of Informative Explanation -- Popper and Bartley on Ideologies -- RESIDUAL DOGMATISM IN POPPER -- RESIDUAL DOGMATISM IN BARTLEY -- Situational Logic -- THE PROPAGANDIST AND SITUATIONAL LOGIC -- Bartley's Test Case: Liberal Protestantism -- KARL BARTH -- PAUL TILLICH -- The Nightmare of Perfect Thought Control -- Martyrdom as a Rational Technique -- [ 2 ] Survival of the Truest -- Evolution and Human Rationality -- Does the Modularity of Mind Undermine Rationality? -- Evolutionary Epistemology.

A Darwinian Epistemology -- General and Specific Problem-Solving -- An Indirect Refutation of the Existence of the Impervious Believer -- Why You Are at Least as Sensible as a Snail -- LIONEL ROBBINS AND THE MODERN CONCEPTION OF ECONOMIC SCIENCE -- TRIAL AND ERROR IN ECONOMIC DECISIONS -- MAX WEBER -- The Fanatic -- GUSTAVE LE BON AND WALTER LAQUEUR -- SUICIDE TERRORISM PAYS -- ABSOLUTE VALUES -- Instrumental Rationality -- A POSSIBLE OBJECTION -- Rhetoric versus Theory -- J.L. AUSTIN -- SOCRATES -- UNFATHOMABLE LIES -- Exploratory Rationality -- Wishful and Fearful Rationality -- DAVID PEARS -- JON ELSTER -- GEORG LUKACS -- WISHFUL BELIEFS AND EXPLORATORY BEHAVIOR -- ABSOLUTE VERSUS VALUE-RELATIVE STUBBORNNESS -- HOFFER ON THE FANATICAL COMMUNIST -- DENISE MEYERSON ON ABSOLUTE IDEOLOGICAL STUBBORNNESS -- Logical Thinking Promotes Survival -- G.A. WELLS AND IMMEDIATE EXPERIENCE -- WOLPERT: BENDING LOGIC TO PRIOR BELIEF -- Natural Selection Doesn't Yield Perfection -- ECOLOGICAL RATIONALITY, AGAIN -- WASON'S EXPERIMENT -- A General Schema for the Evolution of Ideologies under Criticism -- RICHARD DAWKINS: THE HELLFIRE MEME -- FLORIAN VON SCHILCHER AND NEIL TENNANT -- Memetic Evolution of an Ideology -- 1. OCCASION -- 2. EMERGENCE -- 3. REFINEMENT -- 4. TESTING -- 5. PROPAGATION -- Why Ideologies Look Impervious to Criticism -- THE COMPLEXITY OF THE LEARNING TASK -- THE STUBBORNNESS OF IMPORTANT BELIEFS -- POPPER'S 'DOGMATISM' SOCIOLOGIZED -- THE EARLY LOSS OF INTELLECTUAL GIANTS -- RETENTION OF THE ORIGINAL TERMINOLOGY -- FEELING ASHAMED OF HAVING BEEN WRONG -- BAD FAITH AND COWARDICE -- PRESSURE TO CONFORM -- [ 3 ] Does Emotion Cloud Our Reason? -- Ideologies as Rationalizations of Irrational Emotions -- Hitler's Theory of Propaganda -- Intellectual Elites and Emotional Masses -- EVIDENCE FROM PSYCHOLOGY.

HIGH AROUSAL INTERFERES WITH THE TRANSMISSION OF NEW IDEAS -- INTENSE EMOTION TRANSMITS IDEAS ALREADY ACCEPTED -- Suggestion as Simple Assertion -- SUGGESTION AS IMPLICIT ARGUMENT -- Influencing versus Determining Public Opinion -- Long-Term Propaganda versus Political Canvassing -- Thinking about Abstract Ideas versus Thinking in Accord with Them -- Fitting the Theory to the Emotion -- Moral Feelings and Factual Assumptions -- The Role of Intense Emotion -- INTENSE EMOTION AND THE THEORY OF ADVERTISING -- [ 4 ] Ideologies as Shapeshifters -- Immunizing Stratagems -- Popper's Examples of Immunizing Stratagems -- The Demarcation Problem -- Damaging versus Eliminating a System of Ideas -- DO ALL IMMUNIZING STRATAGEMS ABANDON THE ORIGINAL THEORY? -- TYPES OF IMMUNIZING STRATAGEMS -- HARD CORE VERSUS PROTECTIVE BELT -- DUHEM'S PROBLEM -- CHANGING DEMARCATION BETWEEN THE HARD CORE AND THE PROTECTIVE BELT -- Ideological Movements Split -- UNFATHOMABLE IMPLICATIONS OF AN IDEOLOGY -- THE GENERAL STRUCTURE OF IMMUNIZING RESPONSES TO CRITICISM -- Case Study: Marxism -- Marx's Labor Theory of Value -- THE PROBLEM MARX'S THEORY OF VALUE WAS MEANT TO SOLVE -- INADVERTENTLY SELF-INFLICTED INJURIES TO MARX'S THEORY OF VALUE -- THE EVOLUTION OF THE LABOR THEORY OF VALUE IN VOLUME I OF CAPITAL -- ABANDONMENT OF THE THEORY OF EXPLOITATION AND PROFIT -- Case Study: Freudianism -- FREUD'S THEORY OF DREAMS IS TESTABLE -- THE CRITICIZABILITY OF FREUD'S 'BASIC THEORY' -- FURTHER EMPIRICAL REFUTATIONS -- Refutation versus Elimination of Ideologies -- Conclusion -- Notes -- Bibliography -- Index.
Abstract:
“It's like talking to a brick wall" and “We'll have to agree to disagree" are popular sayings referring to the frustrating experience of discussing issues with people who seem to be beyond the reach of argument. It's often claimed that some people—fundamentalists or fanatics—are indeed sealed off from rational criticism. And every month new pop psychology books appear, describing the dumb ways ordinary people make decisions, as revealed by psychological experiments. The conclusion is that all or most people are fundamentally irrational. Ray Scott Percival sets out to demolish the whole notion of the closed mind and of human irrationality. There is a difference between making mistakes and being irrational. Though humans are prone to mistakes, they remain rational. In fact, making mistakes is a sign of rationality: a totally non-rational entity could not make a mistake. Rationality does not mean absence of error; it means the possibility of correcting error in the light of criticism. In this sense, all human beliefs are rational: they are all vulnerable to being abandoned when shown to be faulty. Percival agrees that people cling stubbornly to their beliefs, but he maintains that not being too ready to abandon one's beliefs is rational.
Local Note:
Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, Michigan : ProQuest Ebook Central, 2017. Available via World Wide Web. Access may be limited to ProQuest Ebook Central affiliated libraries.
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