United We Stand?: Divide-and-Conquer Politicsand the Logic ofInternational Hostility -- Contents -- Preface -- Acknowledgments -- Part One: Introduction -- 1. Regime Vulnerability and International Conflict -- Part Two: Theory -- 2. Coup Risk and Military Division: Hostility within the Armed Forces and Regime Survival -- 3. A Theory of Counterbalancing as a Cause of International Conflict -- Part Three: Data -- 4. Regime Vulnerability, Counterbalancing, and International Conflict during the Cold War: A Quantitative Analysis -- 5. Regime Vulnerability as a Cause of Counterbalancing in Syria in the Early 1970s -- 6. When Dividing the Military Provides an Incentive for Conflict: Fragmented Military Forces and InternationalConflict in Shevardnadze's Georgia -- 7. Conclusion -- Notes -- 1. Regime Vulnerability and International Conflict -- 2. Coup-Risk and Military Division -- 3. A Theory of Counterbalancing as a Cause of International Conflict -- 4. Regime Vulnerability, Counterbalancing, and International Conflict during the Cold War -- 5. Regime Vulnerability as a Cause of Counterbalancing in Syria in the early 1970s -- 6. When Dividing the Military Provides an Incentive for Conflict -- 7. Conclusion -- References -- Index -- A -- B -- C -- D -- E -- G -- I -- J -- L -- M -- N -- P -- R -- S -- T -- U -- w -- SUNY series in Global Politics.