Cover image for Learning from Six Philosophers, Volume 1 : Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Locke, Berkeley, Hume.
Learning from Six Philosophers, Volume 1 : Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Locke, Berkeley, Hume.
Title:
Learning from Six Philosophers, Volume 1 : Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Locke, Berkeley, Hume.
Author:
Bennett, Jonathan.
ISBN:
9780191520297
Personal Author:
Physical Description:
1 online resource (424 pages)
Series:
Learning from Six Philosophers (2 Volumes) ; v.1

Learning from Six Philosophers (2 Volumes)
Contents:
Contents -- VOLUME 1 -- Abbreviations -- INTRODUCTION -- CHAPTER 1: CARTESIAN AND ARISTOTELIAN PHYSICS -- 1. Aristotelian physics: a quick sketch -- 2. Aristotle and Descartes: how many fundamental kinds? -- 3. Aristotle and Descartes: four more differences -- 4. Aristotle and Descartes: teleology -- 5. Descartes and two predecessors -- 6. Aristotle, Descartes and the manifest image -- CHAPTER 2: MATTER AND SPACE -- 7. 'Material = extended': why Descartes wanted this doctrine -- 8. 'Material = extended': how Descartes defended this -- 9. Solidity -- 10. Space as extended nothing -- 11. Container space -- 12. Spaces and places -- 13. Space as a system of relations -- 14. The fourth view: space as a separator -- 15. Descartes's 'neighbour' account of motion -- CHAPTER 3: DESCARTES'S PHYSICS -- 16. Smallness of parts -- 17. Subtleness and speed -- 18. Qualitative variety -- 19. Compression -- 20. The integration problem -- 21. Light and movement loops -- 22. Other work for loop theory -- 23. Traction -- 24. Weight -- 25. Was Descartes a 'new Stoic'? -- CHAPTER 4: DESCARTES'S DUALISMS -- 26. Property-dualism -- 27. The indivisibility argument for the 'real distinction' -- 28. 'I am unable to distinguish parts in myself' -- 29. From conception to possibility -- 30. From possibility to actuality: essences -- 31. From possibility to actuality: individual identity -- 32. The Cartesian concept of man -- CHAPTER 5: DESCARTES ON CAUSATION -- 33. Causation and similarity -- 34. Varying the causal resources principle -- 35. Tropes -- 36. Descartes against tropes -- 37. Descartes's non-endurance doctrine -- 38. Body on body -- 39. Mind on body -- 40. Psychology's invasion of physics -- 41. Body on mind: sense perception -- 42. Mind on mind -- CHAPTER 6: PREPARING TO APPROACH SPINOZA -- 43. How to read the Ethics -- 44. Spinoza's dualism -- 45. Spinoza's monism.

46. Spinoza's pantheism -- 47. Spinoza's a priori argument for God's existence -- 48. Mind-body parallelism -- 49. Descartes's robot -- 50. 'A queer kind of medium' -- CHAPTER 7: ONE EXTENDED SUBSTANCE -- 51. The thing thought and the independence thought -- 52. Can a Cartesian body be annihilated? -- 53. Spinoza sees the problem -- 54. Spinoza's solution and Curley's challenge -- 55. Spinoza on bodies as modes -- 56. Objections by Curley -- 57. Spinoza's two levels -- 58. Bodies and motion -- CHAPTER 8: EXPLAINING THE PARALLELISM -- 59. 'Idea of ' in Spinoza -- 60. The official arguments for parallelism -- 61. The thing-identity thesis: explaining parallelism -- 62. Trans-attributes qualities -- 63. A difficulty and a suggested solution -- 64. Five problems solved -- 65. A further problem solved: attribute and essence -- 66. Intellectual limitations? -- 67. Expressing -- CHAPTER 9: EXPLANATORY RATIONALISM -- 68. Causal laws in Spinoza -- 69. Time and eternity -- 70. Is this the only possible world? -- 71. Leibniz's pursuit of contingency -- 72. Choices, especially God's -- CHAPTER 10: SPINOZA ON BELIEF AND ERROR -- 73. Beliefs -- 74. Belief and the will -- 75. Error -- 76. A better account of truth? -- 77. A suggested explanation -- 78. Adequate ideas -- 79. Mutilation -- 80. Confusion -- 81. Spinoza on reason's infallibility -- CHAPTER 11: DESIRE IN DESCARTES AND SPINOZA -- 82. Descartes on desire -- 83. Does Spinoza reject all teleology? -- 84. Spinoza's trouble with thoughtful teleology -- 85. Spinoza's account of appetite -- 86. The 'demonstration' of the conatus doctrine -- CHAPTER 12: LEIBNIZ ARRIVES AT MONADS -- 87. Why there are no material substances -- 88. Why there are immaterial substances -- 89. How bodies relate to monads -- 90. Divisibility and substances: some options -- 91. Why monads are mind-like.

92. An aside on Leibniz's gradualism -- 93. Further evidence that monads are mind-like -- CHAPTER 13: CAUSATION AND PERCEPTION IN LEIBNIZ -- 94. The rejection of inter-substance causation -- 95. Leibniz against occasionalism -- 96. God's conservation of his creatures -- 97. How monads develop -- 98. Perception: the account -- 99. Bottom-up versus top-down -- 100. Perception: the short-fall -- 101. Appetite -- 102. Quasi-activity and -passivity -- CHAPTER 14: LEIBNIZ'S PHYSICS -- 103. The grounding principle -- 104. Some principles of Leibnizian physics -- 105. Forces in Leibniz's physics -- 106. Activity and passivity within the monad -- 107. Leibniz on teleological explanation -- 108. An old myth about teleology -- CHAPTER 15: HARMONY -- 109. The pre-established harmony -- 110. The mirror and collapse problems -- 111. The points of view of monads -- 112. Forward signs and traces -- 113. Why Leibniz needs insensible perceptions -- 114. How Leibniz recommends insensible perceptions -- CHAPTER 16: ANIMALS THAT THINK -- 115. Leibniz against thinking matter -- 116. The grounding principle again -- 117. Leibniz's 'mill' thought-experiment -- 118. Locke's God argument -- 119. How thinking matter relates to Leibniz's metaphysic -- 120. 'Substantial forms' and the unity of organisms -- 121. How dominant monads create organic unity -- 122. The scope of the organic realm -- 123. Corporeal substances -- 124. Distinctness of perceptions -- 125. Brandom's interpretation -- CHAPTER 17: LEIBNIZ'S CONTAINED-PREDICATE DOCTRINE -- 126. Leibniz's contained-predicate doctrine -- 127. God's proper names -- 128. Referring to bodies -- 129. Reference and causality -- 130. Essences -- 131. Infinite analysis: why? -- 132. Infinite analysis: how? -- 133. The contained-predicate doctrine construed as causal -- 134. Freedom and the contained-predicate doctrine.

CHAPTER 18: LEIBNIZ AND RELATIONS -- 135. Relations -- 136. Why Leibniz accepted the supervenience thesis -- 137. Temporal relations -- 138. Relational properties -- 139. Compossibility -- 140. Everything leads to everything else -- 141. Space as a system of relations -- 142. The discernibility of the diverse -- CHAPTER 19: DESCARTES'S SEARCH FOR SECURITY -- 143. What the search was about -- 144. Getting to the omnipotent Deceiver -- 145. The Deceiver's scope: arithmetic and memory -- 146. Defeating the Deceiver -- 147. The non-theological derivation of the truth-rule -- 148. God's role -- 149. Why is there no circle? -- CHAPTER 20: DESCARTES'S STABILITY PROJECT -- 150. Indubitabilty -- 151. The stability project -- 152. Protests -- 153. Interrelating the two projects -- Bibliography -- Index of Persons -- A -- B -- C -- D -- E -- F -- G -- H -- I -- J -- K -- L -- M -- N -- O -- P -- Q -- R -- S -- T -- V -- W -- Y -- Index of Subjects -- A -- B -- C -- D -- E -- F -- G -- H -- I -- L -- M -- O -- R -- S -- T.
Abstract:
Jonathan Bennett engages with the thought of six great thinkers of the early modern period: Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Locke, Berkeley, Hume. While not neglecting the historical setting of each, his chief focus is on the words they wrote. What problem is being tackled? How exactly is the solution meant to work? Does it succeed? If not, why not? What can be learned from its success or failure? For newcomers to the early modern scene, this clearly written work is an excellent introduction to it. Those already in the know can learn how to argue with the great philosophers of the past, treating them as colleagues, antagonists, students, teachers. In this first volume, Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz receive particular attention.
Local Note:
Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, Michigan : ProQuest Ebook Central, 2017. Available via World Wide Web. Access may be limited to ProQuest Ebook Central affiliated libraries.
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