Half Title Page -- Title Page -- Title verso -- Preface -- Contents -- Notes on Contributors -- 1. Introduction: Towards a Normative Theory of the Criminal Trial -- 1. THE TRIAL UNDER ATTACK -- 2. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CRIMINAL TRIAL -- 3. A NORMATIVE THEORY OF THE CRIMINAL TRIAL? -- 4. WHICH TRIAL, WHOSE TRUTH? -- 2. Changing Conceptions of the Scottish Criminal Trial: The Duty to Agree Uncontroversial Evidence -- 1. INTRODUCTION -- 2. THE JUDGE AS INQUISITOR? -- 3. THE PRINCIPLE OF ORALITY -- 4. AN ADVERSARIAL DEFENCE? -- 5. CONCLUSION -- 3. Ritual, Fairness and Truth: The Adversarial and Inquisitional Models of Criminal Trial -- 1. INTRODUCTION -- 2. PURPOSE OF THE CRIMINAL TRIAL -- 3. CONCLUSION -- 4. 'More Than Just Illogical': Truth and Jury Nullification -- 1. TRIALS, JURIES, AND NULLIFICATION -- 2. THE TRIAL CONTEXT -- 3. EVALUATING NULLIFICATION -- 4. CONCLUSION -- 5. The Criminal Trial and the Legitimation of Punishment -- 1. THEORIES OF THE CRIMINAL PROCESS AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW -- 2. PROCESS WITHOUT TRIAL -- 3. AUTONOMY IN THE CRIMINAL PROCESS -- 4. EMPATHY AND INDIRECT AUTONOMY -- 5. THE JURY -- 6. A CONTEXTUAL THEORY OF THE CRIMINAL TRIAL -- 6. Testimony -- 1. TESTIMONY IN EPISTEMOLOGICAL DEBATE -- 2. LEGAL TESTIMONY -- 7. Managing Uncertainty and Finality: The Function of the Criminal Trial in Legal Inquiry -- 1. INTRODUCTION -- 2. THE IMPORTANCE OF TRUTH AND EVIDENCE -- 3. TRUTH AND FINALITY -- 4. THE DEVELOPMENT OF LEGAL METHODS OF PROOF -- 5. TOWARDS FREE PROOF? -- 6. THE MODERN ADVERSARIAL CRIMINAL TRIAL -- 7. THE CONTINENTAL ALTERNATIVE -- 8. THE MODERN CRIMINAL TRIAL UNDER CHALLENGE -- 8. Nothing But the Truth? Some Facts, Impressions and Confessions about Truth in Criminal Procedure -- 1. INTRODUCTION -- 2. TRUTH AND THE AIMS OF PROCEDURE -- 3. CORRESPONDENCE V CONSENSUS -- 4. PATHS TO TRUTH.

5. IMPOSSIBILIUM NULLA EST OBLIGATIO -- 6. RECONSTRUCTION AFTER DECONSTRUCTION -- 9. The Distinctiveness of Trial Narrative -- 1. INTRODUCTION: DESCRIPTION, INTERPRETATION, AND EVALUATION -- 2 AN INTERPRETATION OF THE COMMON LAW TRIAL -- 3 THE ORTHODOX INTERPRETATION: THE RECEIVED VIEW OF THE TRIAL -- 4 THE RHETORICAL DIMENSION OF THE TRIAL -- 5 THE CENTRALITY OF NARRATIVE AT TRIAL: A PRELIMINARY SUMMARY -- 6 EPISTEMOLOGICAL INTERLUDE: WHY THE CHARACTERISTICS OF TRIAL NARRATIVES MATTER -- 7 THE GENERAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE NARRATIVE STRUCTURE OF THE TRIAL -- 8 THE DISTINCTIVENESS OF TRIAL NARRATIVES: THEORY, THEME, AND WITNESS EXAMINATION -- 9 CONCLUSION -- 10. The Objection that Cannot be Heard: Communication and Legitimacy in the Courtroom -- 1. THE UNSEEN -- 2. THE SPECTRE OF SEDITION -- 3. WHAT NORMATIVE UNDERPINNING FOR THE TRIAL? INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL JUSTIFICATIONS AND DISCOURSE THEORY -- 4. ALTERA PARS AUDIATUR -- 5. PETITIO PRINCIPII: SELF-REFERENCE AS JUSTIFICATION -- 6. 'WE, LAWGIVERS, SUBJECTS': METONYMIES OF THE FIRST PERSON PLURAL -- Index.