CONSCIOUSNESS AND QUALIA -- Editorial page -- Title page -- Copyright page -- Table of Contents -- List of Tables and Figures -- Acknowledgments -- CHAPTER ONE. Introduction -- 1.1 Philosophy or Science -- 1.2 Outline One: Some Key Ideas -- 1.3 Outline Two: Chapter Summaries -- 1.4 Caveats -- CHAPTER TWO. Making our Ideas Clear: Consciousness and Qualia -- 2.1 The Thesis -- 2.2 Clarifying the Thesis -- 2.2.1 Qualitative Consciousness -- 2.2.2 An Apology for Qualia -- 2.2.2.1 The Datum -- 2.2.2.2 Why the Datum Is Obvious -- 2.2.2.3 The Neutrality Thesis -- 2.2.2.4 Qualia and Sense-Data -- 2.2.2.5 The Qualia Quiners -- 2.2.2.6 Why the Datum Is Important -- 2.2.2.7 Why the Datum Is Baffling -- 2.2.2.8 Deflating the Bafflement -- 2.2.2.9 Background Materialism -- 2.3 Two Problems: The Nature-problem and the Having-problem -- 2.4 Summary -- CHAPTER THREE. On Method: The First-Person Perspective -- 3.1 The Principle of Phenomenological Adequacy -- 3.2 The Transformation of Consciousness Studies -- 3.3 The Attack on the First-Person Perspective -- 3.3.1 The Charge of Obscurantism and the Love of Mystery -- 3.3.1.1 The First-Person Perspective and anti-Materialism -- 3.3.1.2 The First-Person Perspective and Anti-Scientism -- 3.3.2 The Method of Heterophenomenology -- 3.3.2.1 What Is Heterophenomenology -- 3.3.2.2 Changing the Explanandum -- 3.3.2.3 Dennett's Official Reply -- 3.3.2.4 Phenomenal Realism -- 3.4 The Scope and Limits of this Project -- 3.5 Summary -- CHAPTER FOUR. Higher-Order Representation and Introspection -- 4.1 HOR, HOP, and HOT: Terminology -- 4.2 Is HOR A Theory of Qualitative Consciousness? -- 4.2.1 The Independence of HOR and Qualitative Consciousness -- 4.2.2 Armstrong's Absentminded Driver and the Explanandum of HOR -- 4.2.2.1 Reflections on Armstrong's Driver -- 4.2.3 HOR and What It's Like.

4.3 Why Is HOR's Explanandum Elusive? -- 4.3.1 Qualia: Celluloid vs. the Silver Screen -- 4.3.1.1 Qualia and Secondary Qualities -- 4.3.1.2 The Reaction Criterion -- 4.3.2 Summary of the Analysis -- 4.4 HOR and Introspectionism -- 4.4.1 The Label 'Introspectionism ' -- 4.4.2 Inîrospectionism: A Unitary Phenomenon ? -- 4.4.3 Introspection: Perceptual or Purely Cognitive ? -- 4.4.4 Is there an Introspective Phenomenology? -- 4.4.5 Perception without Phenomenology ? -- 4.4.6 Narrowing the Gap between HOT and HOP -- 4.4. 7 Externalizing Qualia -- 4.4.8 Qualia: Mental Paint vs. Physical Paint -- 4.5 Summary -- CHAPTER FIVE. The Allure of Introspectionism -- 5.1 Explaining Consciousness through Introspection: Introspectionism -- 5.2 Why Introspectionism Seems Obvious -- 5.2.1 The Definitional Link -- 5.2.2 The Best-Explanation Connection -- 5.2.3 Consciousness and the Consciousness of Consciousness -- 5.2.4 Introspectionism's Insight -- 5.2.5 Preserving the Insight -- 5.3 The Epistemology of Consciousness and Introspection -- 5.3.1 Three Forms of Epistemic Access to Our Own Minds -- 5.3.2 The Transition to Introspectionism: The Epistemic Argument -- 5.3.2.1 Identity: Introspections are Qualitative Beliefs -- 5.3.2.2 Presupposition: Qualitative Beliefs Presuppose Introspections -- 5.4 Severing Consciousness from Introspection -- 5.5 The Introspective Access Assumption -- 5.6 Against the Three Epistemological Theses -- 5.7 The Special-Knowledge Thesis -- 5. 7.1 The Argument From Materialism -- 5. 7.2 The Argument from Conceptualization -- 5. 7.3 The Argument from Deviant Reasons -- 5.7.4 Assessment of the Special-Knowledge Thesis -- 5.8 The Fallible-Knowledge Thesis -- 5.9 The Belief Thesis -- 5.9.1 Detached Qualitative Beliefs -- 5.9.2 Detached Qualia -- 5.9.2.1 The First Appeal to Phenomenology -- 5.9.2.2 Simple Minds -- 5.10 Summary.

CHAPTER SIX. Oscar, the Unconscious Introspector: A Case Study -- 6.1 Pollock's Oscar as Imitation Man -- 6.2 Rational Functionalism and Consciousness -- 6.2.1 Linking Rationality and Consciousness -- 6.2.2 The Role of Consciousness in the Human Rational Architecture -- 6.3 How to Build Consciousness into Oscar -- 6.4 Doubting that Oscar Is Conscious -- 6.4.1 Perception without Sensation -- 6.4.2 The Lessons of Blindsight -- 6.4.3 Pollock's Analysis of Blindsight -- 6.4.4 Introspection and learning -- 6.4.5 The Capacities of Blindsighted Subjects -- 6.4.6 Blindsight and Learning: A Dilemma -- 6.4. 7 The Argument from Blindsight -- 6.4.8 An Objection to the Argument from Blindsight -- 6.4.9 Reply to the Objection -- 6.5 Should We Take the Possibility of Oscar's Blindsight Seriously? -- 6.5.1 Two Arguments for Taking Oscar's Blindsight Seriously -- 6.5.1.1 The Argument from Parsimony -- 6.5.1.2 The Argument from Mystery -- 6.5.2 An Objection: The Two Arguments Prove too Much -- 6.5.3 Two Arguments Against Taking Oscar's Blindsight Seriously -- 6.5.3.1 The Argument From Analogy -- 6.5.3.2 The (Thought) Experimental Solution: Trying on Oscar -- 6.6 Summary -- CHAPTER SEVEN. Relocating Qualia -- 7.1 Three (or Four) Ways of DeMenting Qualia -- 7.2 Denying Qualia -- 7.3 Wholehearted Relocation -- 7.3.1 The Expanding Sphere of Consciousness: The Inflation Problem -- 7.3.1.1 Rarefaction -- 7.4 Support for the Relocation Theses -- 7.4.1 The Second Appeal to Phenomenology -- 7.4.2 The Inconclusiveness of the Appeal to Phenomenology -- 7.4.3 No Mental Home for Qualia -- 7.5 Halfhearted Relocation: The Colored-Brain Thesis -- 7.5.1 Mental Representations Old and New -- 7.5.2 Qualia- "Nowhere to Be Found in the Head " -- 7.5.3 Exemplifying Qualia and Having Qualia -- 7.5.4 The Prospects of Halfhearted Relocation -- 7.6 The Price of Wholehearted Relocation.

7.6.1 Does Wholehearted Relocation support the Belief Thesis? -- 7.6.2 Does Wholehearted Relocation undermine the Belief Thesis? -- 7.6.3 Wholehearted Relocation and the Existence of Qualia -- 7.7 Summary -- CHAPTER EIGHT. Having Relocated Qualia -- 8.1 Complicating the Picture: Four Representation-Based Theories -- 8.2 Cell (1): Internal Qualia with HO Representation -- 8.2.1 The Problem of the Rock -- 8.2.2 Mediate and Immediate HO Thoughts -- 8.2.3 The Official Reply to the Rock -- 8.2.4 The Rock and Intrinsicalism -- 8.2.5 HOT: Analysis not Explanation -- 8.2.6 Assessing the Rock -- 8.3 Cell (2): Internal Qualia without HO Representation -- 8.4 Cell (3): External Qualia with HO Representation -- 8.4.1 Introspectionism and Relocation -- 8.4.2 The Inner Sense and the External World -- 8.5 Cell (4): External Qualia without HO Representation -- 8.5.1 Precursors: Naive Realism and Moore -- 8.5.2 Dretske's Representationalism -- 8.5.3 What Does Representationalism Explain ? -- 8.6 Summary -- 8.7 My Position: A Preview -- CHAPTER NINE. Denying Relocated Qualia -- 9.1 The Argument from Illusion and Nonexistent Qualia-Bearers -- 9.1.1 The Route to Nonexistent Qualia-Bearers -- 9.2 Problems With Intentional Objects -- 9.2.1 Intentional Objects à la (Early) Brentano -- 9.2.2 Intentional Objects à la Meinong -- 9.2.3 Intentional Objects and Possible World -- 9.2.3.1 Lewisian Realism -- 9.2.3.2 Ersatzism -- 9.2.4 How to Perceive Otherworldly Objects -- 9.2.5 Halfhearted Relocationism and the Problems of Illusion -- 9.3 The Argument from Atomism and Illusory Qualia -- 9.3.1 Direct Reductive Realism about Color -- 9.3.2 The Illusion of Concrete Secondary Quality: Armstrong's Account -- 9.3.3 Piercing the Illusion -- 9.3.4 The Nature of the Illusion -- 9.3.4.1 Seeming and Believing -- 9.3.4.2 Seeming and the Language of Thought: Lycan 's Way Out.

9.3.5 The Origin of the Illusion -- 9.3.5.1 The Gestalt Model -- 9.3.5.2 Resemblances and Intrinsic Natures -- 9.3.5.3 The Headless-Woman Illusion -- 9.3.5.4 Should We Trust the Impression of Simplicity? -- 9.3.5.5 'Illusion' of Concrete Secondary Quality? -- 9.3.6 The Depth of the Illusion -- 9.3.6.1 First Interpretation: Total Illusion -- 9.3.6.2 Second Interpretation: Partial Illusion -- 9.3.6.3 Third Interpretation: Minimal Illusion -- 9.3. 7 DIRE Realism and Illusory Colors -- 9.4 Summary -- CHAPTER TEN. Consciousness: The Having of Qualia -- 10.1 Learning from Mistakes -- 10.2 Isolating Two Pernicious Assumptions -- 10.3 Adverbialism -- 10.3.1 Problems with Adverbialism -- 10.3.2 The Reappearance of the Two Pernicious Assumptions -- 10.3.3 The Phenomenal Adequacy of Adverbialism -- 10.4 Monism -- 10.5 Monism and the Having-Problem -- 10.5.1 The Neutral Theory of Experience -- 10.5.2 The Bundle Theory of the Self -- 10.5.3 The Phenomenal Adequacy of Monism -- 10.5.4 Challenging the Monistic Account of Having -- 10.5.5 Challenge One: Monism Is Unilluminating -- 10.5.6 Challenge Two: Monism Entails Infallibilism -- 10.5.6.1 The Noncognitive Nature of Monism -- 10.5.7 Challenge Three: Monism Entails Nonnaturalism -- 10.6 Monism and the Nature-Problem -- 10.6.1 The Bundle Theory of Percepts -- 10.6.2 The Physical Location of Percepts -- 10.6.2.1 The Colored-Brain Problem -- 10.6.3 The Metaphysical Location of Percepts -- 10.6.3.1 The Other Identity Theory -- 10.6.3.2 Matter as All Gap: Structural Realism -- 10.6.3.3 Filling the Gap: Qualia as the Basic Reality -- 10.6.3.4 Events, Matter, and Grain -- 10.6.4 The Threat of Panpsychism -- 10.7 Summary -- Notes -- References -- Detailed Table of Contents -- Index.