SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES -- SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES -- CONTENTS -- PREFACE -- MARINE CORPS IN SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES∗ -- MANAGEMENT ACTIONS ARE NEEDED TO EFFECTIVELYINTEGRATE MARINE CORPS FORCES INTO THE U.S. SPECIALOPERATIONS COMMAND -- What GAO Found -- Why GAO Did This Study -- What GAO Recommends -- ABBREVIATIONS -- RESULTS IN BRIEF -- BACKGROUND -- Tasks and Missions of Special Operations Forces -- Prior Actions Taken to Integrate Marine Corps Forces into USSOCOM -- Organization of Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command -- Funding for the Marine Corps Special Operations Command -- ALTHOUGH SOME PROGRESS MADE IN ESTABLISHINGMARINE CORPS SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND, FORCESTRUCTURE NEEDED TO PERFORM ITS MISSIONSHAS NOT BEEN FULLY IDENTIFIED -- Steps Taken to Establish Marine Corps Special Operations Command, butInitial Force Structure Plans Were Not Developed Using Critical Practices ofEffective Strategic Planning -- Limitations in Strategic Planning Process Led to Force Structure Challenges,although Plans Are Being Revised to Address These Challenges -- ALTHOUGH PRELIMINARY STEPS HAVE BEEN TAKEN,THE MARINE CORPS HAS NOT DEVELOPED A STRATEGICHUMAN CAPITAL APPROACH TO MANAGE THE CRITICALSKILLS AND COMPETENCIES REQUIRED OF PERSONNEL IN ITSSPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND -- While Some Personnel Requirements Have Been Identified, Marine CorpsSpecial Operations Command Has Not Fully Identified the Critical Skillsand Competencies Required of Its Personnel -- Marine Corps Has Developed an Interim Policy to Manage Personnel in ItsSpecial Operations Command, but It Lacks Consensus on a Strategic HumanCapital Approach -- USSOCOM DOES NOT HAVE A SOUND BASIS FOR DETERMININGWHETHER MARINE CORPS SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCESTRAINING PROGRAMS PREPARE UNITS FOR MISSIONS.

Marine Corps Special Operations Command Has Implemented Programs toTrain Personnel to Perform Special Operations Missions -- USSOCOM Has Not Formally Validated That Marine Corps Training MeetsSpecial Operations Forces Standards and Prepares Forces to Be FullyInteroperable with Other Forces -- CONCLUSIONS -- RECOMMENDATIONS FOR EXECUTIVE ACTION -- AGENCY COMMENTS AND OUR EVALUATION -- APPENDIX I: SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY -- APPENDIX II: COMMENTS FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE -- APPENDIX III: GAO CONTACT AND STAFF ACKNOWLEDGMENTS -- GAO Contact -- Acknowledgments -- REFERENCE -- SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND'S MANAGEMENTOF WEAPON SYSTEM PROGRAMS∗ -- WHAT GAO FOUND -- Why GAO Did This Study -- What GAO Recommends -- ABBREVIATIONS -- RESULTS IN BRIEF -- BACKGROUND -- SOCOM'S ACQUISITION PROGRAMS ARE CONSISTENT WITH THECOMMAND'S MISSION -- Most of SOCOM's Acquisition Programs Are Small -- Leaflet Delivery System -- Modification to the Army's Service-Common CH-47 Helicopter -- Some SOCOM Programs Are Targeted to Urgent Needs -- SOCOM'S ACQUISITION PROGRAM PERFORMANCEHAS BEEN MIXED -- SOCOM FACES MANAGEMENT AND WORKFORCE CHALLENGES INITS ACQUISITION PROGRAMS -- SOCOM Management Challenges -- SOCOM Workforce Challenges -- CONCLUSIONS -- RECOMMENDATIONS FOR EXECUTIVE ACTIONS -- AGENCY COMMENTS AND OUR EVALUATION -- APPENDIX I: SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY -- APPENDIX II: SOCOM'S POLICIES, PROCEDURES, ANDORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE FOR MANAGINGACQUISITIONS -- SOCOM Plans, Resources, Acquires, and Sustains Weapon Systems Allunder One Roof -- SOCOM Has Unique Program Management Structure Options -- APPENDIX III: COMMENTS FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE -- APPENDIX IV: GAO CONTACT AND STAFF ACKNOWLEDGMENTS -- STAFF ACKNOWLEDGMENTS -- RELATED GAO PRODUCTS -- REFERENCE.

DEFENSE INFRASTRUCTURE: REALIGNMENT OF AIRFORCE SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND UNITS TOCANNON AIR FORCE BASE, NEW MEXICO∗ -- ABSTRACT -- BACKGROUND -- FACTORS THAT AFFECTED THE DECISION TO MOVE TO CANNON -- Air Force's Response to the BRAC 2005 Contingency Clause -- AFSOC's Desire for Another Location -- COST AND TIMELINE OF AFSOC'S MOVE TO CANNON -- Funding Requirements to Establish AFSOC Mission at Cannon -- Timeline for Moving Personnel to Cannon Air Force Base -- CONCLUSIONS -- Matter for Congressional Consideration -- Agency Comments -- Comments from the Department of Defense -- GAO CONTACT AND STAFF ACKNOWLEDGMENTS -- RELATED GAO PRODUCTS -- REFERENCE -- U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES (SOF):BACKGROUND AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS∗ -- ABSTRACT -- BACKGROUND -- USSOCOM BUDGET -- CURRENT ISSUES -- ISSUES FOR CONGRESS -- REFERENCE -- CURRENT MANNING, EQUIPPING AND READINESSCHALLENGES FACING SPECIAL OPERATIONSFORCES: HEARING BEFORE THE TERRORISM,UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS AND CAPABILITIESSUBCOMMITTEE∗ -- OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH,A REPRESENTATIVE FROM WASHINGTON,CHAIRMAN, TERRORISM, UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS ANDCAPABILITIES SUBCOMMITTEE -- STATEMENT OF HON.MAC THORNBERRY,A REPRESENTATIVE FROM TEXAS, RANKING MEMBER,TERRORISM, UNCONVENTIONAL THREATSAND CAPABILITIES SUBCOMMITTEE -- STATEMENT OF GEN. BRYAN D. BROWN, COMMANDER, U.S.SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND, U.S. ARMY -- STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. ROBERT W.WAGNER,COMMANDER, U.S. ARMYSPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND, U.S. ARMY -- STATEMENT OF REAR ADM. JOSEPH MAGUIRE, COMMANDER,NAVAL SPECIAL WARFARE COMMAND, U.S. NAVY -- STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. DENNIS J. HEJLIK,COMMANDER, U.S.MARINE CORPSFORCES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND,U.S.MARINE CORPS -- STATEMENT OF LT. GEN.MICHAEL W.WOOLEY,COMMANDER, AIR FORCE SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND,U.S. AIR FORCE -- APPENDIX -- QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SMITH.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. THORNBERRY -- TERRORISM, UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS AND CAPABILITIESSUBCOMMITTEE -- POSTURE OF SPECIAL OPERATIONSFORCES: STATEMENT OFADMIRAL ERIC T. OLSON, U.S. NAVY∗ -- ADMIRAL ERIC T. OLSON COMMANDERUNITED STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND -- Deter, Disrupt, and Defeat Terrorist Threats -- Develop and Support Our People and Their Families -- Sustain and Modernize the Force -- CONCLUSION -- INDEX.