Cover -- Title Page -- Copyright -- Preface -- Contents -- Figures and Table -- Summary -- Acknowledgments -- Abbreviations -- CHAPTER ONE Introduction -- Some Hypothetical Crises -- Mutual Mistrust Is Likely to Characterize a Cybercrisis -- States May Have Room for Maneuver in a Cybercrisis -- A Note on Methodology -- Purpose and Organization -- CHAPTER TWO Avoiding Crises by Creating Norms -- What Kind of Norms Might Be Useful? -- Enforce Laws Against Hacking -- Dissociate from Freelance Hackers -- Discourage Commercial Espionage -- Be Careful About the Obligation to Suppress Cybertraffic -- How Do We Enforce Norms? -- Confidence-Building Measures -- Norms for Victims of Cyberattacks -- Norms for War -- Deception -- Military Necessity and Collateral Damage -- Proportionality -- Reversibility -- Conclusions -- CHAPTER THREE Narratives, Dialogue, and Signals -- Narratives to Promote Control -- A Narrative Framework for Cyberspace -- Victimization, Attribution, Retaliation, and Aggression -- Victimization -- Attribution -- Retaliation -- Aggression -- Emollients: Narratives to Walk Back a Crisis -- "We Did Nothing" -- "Well, At Least Not on Our Orders" -- "It Was an Accident" -- "This Is Nothing New" -- "At Least It Does Not Portend Anything" -- Broader Considerations -- Signals -- Ambiguity in Signaling -- Signaling Resolve -- Signaling That Cybercombat Is Not Kinetic Combat -- Conclusions -- CHAPTER FOUR Escalation Management -- Motives for Escalation -- Does Escalation Matter? -- Escalation Risks -- Escalation Risks in Phase 0 -- Escalation Risks for Contained Local Conflicts -- Escalation Risks for Uncontained Conflicts -- Managing Proxy Cyberattacks -- What Hidden Combatants Imply for Horizontal Escalation -- Managing Overt Proxy Conflict -- The Difficulties of Tit-for-Tat Management -- The Importance of Preplanning.

Disjunctions Among Effort, Effect, and Perception -- Inadvertent Escalation -- Escalation into Kinetic Warfare -- Escalation into Economic Warfare -- Sub-Rosa Escalation -- Managing the Third-Party Problem -- The Need for a Clean Shot -- Inference and Narrative -- Command and Control -- Commanders -- Those They Command -- Conclusions -- CHAPTER FIVE Implications for Strategic Stability -- Translating Sources of Cold War Instability to Cyberspace -- What Influence Can Cyberwar Have If Nuclear Weapons Exist? -- Can a Cyberattack Disarm a Target State's Nuclear Capabilities? -- Can a Cyberattack Disarm a Target State's Cyberwarriors? -- Does Cyberwar Lend Itself to Alert-Reaction Cycles? -- Are Cyberdefenses Inherently Destabilizing? -- Would a Cyberspace Arms Race Be Destabilizing? -- Surprise Attack as a Source of Instability -- Misperception as a Source of Crisis -- One Side Takes Great Exception to Cyberespionage -- Defenses Are Misinterpreted as Preparations for War -- Too Much Confidence in Attribution -- Too Much Confidence in or Fear of Preemption -- Supposedly Risk-Free Cyberattacks -- Neutrality -- Conclusions -- CHAPTER SIX Can Cybercrises Be Managed? -- APPENDIXES -- A. Distributed Denial-of-Service Attacks -- B. Overt, Obvious, and Covert Cyberattacks and Responses -- C. Can Good Cyberdefenses Discourage Attacks? -- Bibliography.