Contents -- Preface -- The Scientific Study of Bureaucracy: An Overview -- Part 1. Theory -- Why Do Bureaucrats Delay? Lessons from a Stochastic Optimal Stopping Model of Agency Timing, with Applications to the FDA -- Agency Risk Propensities Involving the Demand for Bureaucratic Discretion -- Veto Points, Policy Preferences, and Bureaucratic Autonomy in Democratic Systems -- The Benefits of Agency Policy-making: Perspectives from Positive Theory -- Part 2. Methodological Technology -- Donut Shops, Speed Traps, and Paperwork: Supervision and the Allocation of Time to Bureaucratic Tasks -- Adapting Agencies: Competition, Imitation, and Punishment in the Design of Bureaucratic Performance -- Part 3. Empirical Studies -- Consensual Rule Making and the Time It Takes to Develop Rules -- Why It Matters Whether State Bureaucrats as Opposed to Federal Bureaucrats Administer Federal Programs -- Structural Choice and Political Control of Bureaucracy: Updating Federal Credit Programs -- Administrative Structure and Social Democratic Results: The Case of Education -- Bureaucratic Discretion and Regulatory Success without Enforcement -- Conclusion: An Agenda for the Scientific Study of Bureaucracy -- References -- Contributors -- Author Index -- Subject Index.