Cover -- THE SCEPTICAL CHALLENGE -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Table of Contents -- Acknowledgements -- Abbreviations -- Introduction -- 1 KNOWLEDGE, JUSTIFICATION AND TRUTH -- Introduction -- The concept of epistemic justification -- The circle of belief -- Why does justification matter? -- Knowledge without justification -- Knowledge: beyond truth and justification -- Does knowledge-scepticism matter? -- Conclusion -- 2 THE SCEPTICAL LIFE -- Radical scepticism -- The agnostic life -- Is it possible to suspend belief? -- The logical defence of agnosticism -- The ethical defence of agnosticism -- The implementation of the sceptical doctrine -- The sceptical doctrine and the practical difficulties -- 3 THE CHALLENGE -- Two types of scepticism -- The sceptical doctrine and its justification -- Further solutions -- A way out of the predicament -- 4 THE RESPONSE -- Our objective -- Our strategy -- Naturalized epistemology? -- Modest epistemology -- 5 DESCARTES' SCEPTICAL CHALLENGE -- Introduction -- The Cartesian Circle -- The source of the circularity: one diagnosis -- Descartes is not an antecedent sceptic -- A non-circular response to consequent scepticism? -- Doing without the principle of clarity and distinctness? -- Beginning with the principle of clarity and distinctness? -- An alternative diagnosis of the circle -- 6 INDUCTIVE SCEPTICISM -- Introduction -- Whose problem is it anyway? -- The first premise -- The second premise -- The third premise -- The fourth and fifth premises -- The argument newly couched -- 7 SCEPTICISM AND THE STRUCTURE OF JUSTIFICATION -- Introduction -- Terminology -- Arguments against terminating chains of justification -- An argument against infinite justification chains -- A second argument against infinite justification chains -- Arguments against circular justification chains.

Is groundless justification trivial? -- Is terminating justification trivial? -- Triviality: a red herring -- 8 INDUCTIVE SCEPTICISM REVISITED -- Introduction -- What justification are we seeking? -- Can induction's reliability be shown deductively? -- Must induction be non-empirically justified? -- The apriorist urge -- Can induction be justified empirically? -- The justification of induction -- 9 TRANSCENDENT SCEPTICISM AND INFERENCE TO THE BEST EXPLANATION -- Introduction -- Is the unobservable epistemically inaccessible? -- Van Fraassen's argument -- Hume's argument -- Russell's first argument -- Russell's second argument -- Moderate scepticism? -- 10 THE DEMON ARGUMENT REVISITED -- Introduction -- Denying the second premise? -- Denying the first premise -- Williams' objection -- Inferring the world from appearances -- Alston's objection -- Further objections rebutted -- Transcendental arguments -- 11 THE DREAM ARGUMENT REVISITED -- Introduction -- Rejecting the first premise -- Sextus' dream argument -- Conclusion -- Notes -- Bibliography -- Index.