Cover -- Half Title -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Table of Contents -- Preface -- 1. The puzzles of language -- 1.1 The uses of language -- 1.2 Words and meanings -- 1.3 Compositionality -- 1.4 The normativity of meaning -- 2. The starting-point for analysis -- 2.1 Knowledge -- 2.2 Linguistic meaning -- 2.3 Frege's distinction between sense and reference -- 2.4 Russell's theory of descriptions -- 2.5 Kripke's attack on descriptivism about names -- 2.6 Analysis and singular terms -- 3. Analysing sentence-meaning -- 3.1 Specifying sentence-meaning -- 3.2 Natural and non-natural meaning -- 3.3 Speaker-meaning -- 3.4 Sentence-meaning -- 3.5 Problems for Grice's account -- 4. Analysing synonymy -- 4.1 The analytic-synthetic distinction -- 4.2 Holism -- 5. Radical translation -- 5.1 The indeterminacy of translation (the argument from below) -- 5.2 Methodological considerations -- 5.3 The indeterminacy of translation -- 5.4 Quine's conclusions on meaning -- 5.5 Evans's response -- 6. The structure of a theory of meaning -- 6.1 What is a theory of meaning? -- 6.2 Systematicity -- 6.3 The distinction between sense and force -- 6.4 The centrality of assertion -- 6.5 Use-conditions versus truth-conditions -- 6.6 Use-conditional theories of understanding -- 7. Radical interpretation -- 7.1 Constraints on an adequate theory of truth -- 7.2 The Principle of Charity -- 7.3 An application: saying that -- 7.4 Compositionality and extensionality -- 7.5 Davidson and Foster -- 7.6 Dummett on Davidson -- 8. Linguistic norms, communication and radical interpretation -- 8.1 Davidson on communication -- 8.2 A non-normative conception of meaning? -- 8.3 Norms and mistakes -- 8.4 A generalization of the argument? -- 9. Linguistic normativity -- 9.1 Norms and prescriptions -- 9.2 Correctness-conditions, practical reasoning and norms -- 9.3 Non-literal uses of language.

9.4 Are the norms substantial? -- 10. Radical or robust? -- 10.1 The mysteriousness of language -- 10.2 Doing away with radical interpretation -- 10.3 Indeterminacy of reference -- 10.4 Arguments for robust publicity -- 10.5 Rejecting indeterminacy of reference -- 11. Language and community -- 11.1 Natural language is essentially communal: semantic externalism -- 11.2 Communication requires publicity of meaning -- 12. Rules and privacy: the problem -- 12.1 The problem of rule-following -- 12.2 Kripke's sceptical solution -- 12.3 Problems for the sceptical solution -- 13. Rules and privacy: the solution? -- 13.1 Can there be a private language? -- 13.2 Platonism about rules -- 13.3 Consensualism -- 13.4 Finding a way forward -- 13.5 Back to the theory of meaning -- 13.6 Privacy and first-personal authority -- 14. Truth-conditions versus use-conditions -- 14.1 Dummett's attack on truth-conditional theories -- 14.2 Brandom on inferentialism versus representationalism -- 14.3 Use-conditional accounts of meaning -- 14.4 The problematic pairs -- 14.5 The analytic-synthetic distinction -- Notes -- Bibliography -- Index.