Contents -- Notes on Original Publication -- 1. Truth, Meaning, and Prepositional Attitudes -- 1. Tarski's Theory of Truth -- Postscript -- 2. Mental Representation -- Postscript -- 3. Stalnaker on Intentionality -- 4. Deflationist Views of Meaning and Content -- Postscript -- 5. Attributions of Meaning and Content -- 2. Indeterminacy and Factual Defectiveness -- 6. Theory Change and the Indeterminacy of Reference -- Postscript -- 7. Quine and the Correspondence Theory -- Appendix: Indeterminacy in the Metalanguage -- Postscript -- 8. Disquotational Truth and Factually Defective Discourse -- 9. Some Thoughts on Radical Indeterminacy -- Postscript -- 10. Indeterminacy, Degree of Belief, and Excluded Middle -- Postscript -- 3. Objectivity -- 11. Mathematical Objectivity and Mathematical Objects -- 12. Which Undecidable Mathematical Sentences Have Determinate Truth Values? -- Postscript -- 13. Apriority as an Evaluative Notion -- Appendix: Rules and Basic Rules -- References -- Index -- A -- B -- C -- D -- E -- F -- G -- H -- I -- J -- K -- L -- M -- N -- O -- P -- Q -- R -- S -- T -- U -- V -- W -- Y.