Stealing the Sword : Limiting Terrorist Use of Advanced Conventional Weapons.
Başlık:
Stealing the Sword : Limiting Terrorist Use of Advanced Conventional Weapons.
Yazar:
Bonomo, James.
ISBN:
9780833042873
Yazar Ek Girişi:
Fiziksel Tanımlama:
1 online resource (155 pages)
İçerik:
Cover -- Preface -- Contents -- Figures -- Tables -- Summary -- Acknowledgments -- Abbreviations -- Chapter One - Introduction -- Study Approach -- Chapter Two - What Types of Advanced Military Weapons Could Become Available to Terrorists? -- Advanced Small Arms -- Technological Advance:Airburst Assault Weapons with Smart Ammo -- Technological Advance:Metal Storm's 100 Percent Electronic Firing Mechanism -- Mortar Systems -- Technological Advance: Gliding and Rocketing to Longer Range -- Technological Advance:Nonballistic Flight Through Thrusters and Control Fins -- Technological Advance:"Fire-and-Forget" IR- and RF-Homing Terminal Guidance -- Technological Advance:Laser and Fiber-Optic Man-in-the-Loop Terminal Guidance -- Technological Advance:GPS-Based Computer Aids, Integration, and GPS-Only Guidance -- Technological Advance:Lightweight Materials and Design Changes to Increase Speed -- Technological Advance: Greater Penetration, Greater Area Coverage -- Conclusion -- Sniper Systems -- Technological Advance: Ballistics Computers -- Technological Advance: Remote Aiming Platforms -- Technological Advance: Enhanced Scopes and Reticules -- Technological Advance: Long-Range Night Vision for Snipers -- Technological Advance: Rangefinders -- Technological Advance: Environmental Sensors -- Antitank Guided Weapons -- Man-Portable Antiarmor Weapons -- Limpet Mines -- Advanced Land Mines -- Night Vision -- Technological Advance: Four Generations of Light Intensification -- Technological Advance: Seeing Heat -- Chapter Three - What Advanced Conventional Weapons Are Potentially Most Useful and Attractive to Terrorists? -- Game-Changing Weapons -- Terrorist Scenarios Involving Advanced ConventionalWeapons -- Mortar Attacks -- Attack on the Rose Bowl: A Scenario -- Sniper Attacks -- Attacks Using Advanced Small Arms -- Attacks Using Antitank Guided Weapons.
Attacks Using Limpet Mines -- Comparing the Most Threatening Advanced ConventionalWeapons -- Chapter Four - What Opportunities Exist for Controlling Weapons of Particular Concern? -- Types of Use Controls -- Policy and Procedural Controls -- Technical Controls -- A Conceptual Design of a Use Control System -- Combining Policy, Procedures, and Technical Solutions -- Chapter Five - How Might Use Controls Deter Terrorist Organizations? -- The Benefits, Costs, and Risks of Adopting AdvancedConventional Weapons -- Benefits Drive the Adoption Process -- Cost Considerations -- Risks in Acquiring New Technologies -- Potential Impacts of Weapon Control Measures -- Conclusions -- Chapter Six - Observations and Implications -- Bibliography.
Özet:
Part of a series examining the technology competition between security organizations and terrorist organizations, this report focuses on understanding how terrorist groups make technology choices and consequently how the United States can discourage their adoption of advanced conventional weapons. Five types of advanced conventional weapons are identified that could provide terrorists with a new and qualitatively different weapon capability: sniper rifles, squad-level weapons, antitank missiles, large limpet mines, and mortar systems. Two key methods of limiting the threat from these systems in the hands of terrorists are explored: raising awareness of the threat, and reducing the threat through procedural and technical use controls. Technical use controls offer the surest limitations on terrorist use, but are by far most practical to incorporate when the system is in its design phase. GPS-guided mortars are the most worrisome of the advanced conventional weapons, attractive to terrorists and difficult to mitigate with only awareness and procedural controls. Fortunately, these systems are still in their design phase. For this reason, taking steps now to control GPS-guided mortars is urgent. Two initial steps are needed to begin placing additional procedural and technical use controls on these precise, indirect fire weapons: begin diplomatic discussions with the key producer nations to raise awareness of potential terrorist use of these systems, and commission a detailed technical study of the technical modules and architecture needed to implement proposed technical controls. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) can play a key role in both these steps by pushing to begin diplomatic discussions and by conducting a detailed study, perhaps with the National Security Agency, of the technical architecture for use controls. Additionally, DHS
should become a permanent member of the interagency panels considering arms exports. The time to begin negotiating and developing meaningful controls on GPS-guided mortars is now, before the opportunity is lost.
Notlar:
Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, Michigan : ProQuest Ebook Central, 2017. Available via World Wide Web. Access may be limited to ProQuest Ebook Central affiliated libraries.
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