Contents -- Preface -- Acknowledgments -- Chapter 1. Introduction -- 1. Major Objective, Grand Strategy, Chief Topics -- 2. The Four Mechanisms of Singular Reference: Our Chief Topics -- 3. The Hierarchical Web of Reference -- 4. Some Data: A Pentacostal Miracle in Reverse -- 5. Strategic Plan and Major Methodological Focus and Constraints -- 6. Some Major Theses Developed in the Ensuing Studies -- Notes -- Part I. The Language of Singular Reference -- Chapter 2. The Semantics and the Causal Roles of Proper Names in Our Thinking of Particulars: The Restricted-Variable/Retrieval View of Proper Names -- 1. The Intriguing and Most Revealing Story of Greta Bergman and Oscar A. A.Hecdnett -- 2. Oscar Hecdnett's World: Exegesis of the Data -- 3. Some Exegetical Morals of the Bergman-Hecdnett Story -- 4. Some Crucial Problems for Any Theory of Proper Names -- 5. Theoretical Tasks -- 6. Some Logical and Semantical Aspects of Proper Names -- 7. The Restricted Variable View of the Semantic Roles of Proper Names -- 8. The Sortal Properties of the Type Being Called Such and Such -- 9. A Complementary View of the Semantic of Proper Names -- 10. The Causal and Epistemic Roles of Ordinary Proper Names: The (Causal) Retrieval View -- 11. The Restricted-Variable/Retrieval View of Proper Names: A Summary -- 12. Some Types of Semantic Theories of Proper Names -- 13. The Theory of Causal Reference with Rigid Designation -- 14. The Attribute Approach -- 15. Burge's Demonstrative-Variable/Descriptive View of Proper Names -- 16. Howard Wettstein's Datum -- 17. Conclusion -- Notes -- Chapter 3. Singular Descriptions -- 1. Singular Reference and Individuation by Networks of Differences -- 2. The Contextual Dimension of the Semantics of Quantification -- 3. The Hierarhical Nature of Thinking -- 4. The Indexical and Contextual Dimensions of Singular Descriptions -- Notes.

Chapter 4. Indexical Reference is Experiential Reference -- 1. Confrontational Reference -- 2. Irreducibility of Indexical Reference -- 3. The Irreducibility of the Differences in Grammatical Person -- 4. Three Hurdles for Reductionism of Indexical Reference -- 5. Perceptual Reference and Vicarious Confrontational Reference -- 6. Storytelling: Staging the Story and Telling the Story Proper -- 7. Boër and Lycan's Waning Attack against the Irreducibility First-Person Reference -- 8. Interim Conclusion -- Notes -- Chapter 5. Attributing Reference to Others: The Language of Other Minds -- 1. Attribution of Thought Content: Propositional Transparency -- 2. Attribution of Reference: Internal/External Construal of Terms, and Proposition Transparency -- 3. De re/de dicto Occurrences of Terms, and Apparent References to Nonexistents -- 4. Quine's Referential Transparence, and the Crucial Problems of Referential Opacity -- 5. Proper Names: Their Essential Opacity and Their Special Psychologico-Linguistic Attribution Cumulation Role -- 6. The Propositional Opacity of Indicators in Attributions of Mental states or Acts -- 7. Attribution of Indexical Reference: Quasi-Indicators and Some of Their Main Laws, Essential for the Language of Other Minds -- 8. Taking Stock -- Notes -- Part II. Reference and Experience -- Chapter 6. Perception: Its Internal Indexical Accusatives and Their Implicit Quasi-Indexical Representation -- 1. General Issues and Two Classical Views of Perceptual Accusatives -- 2. Perceptual Reference: Indexical Individuals, and the Primacy of Perceptual Fields -- 3. The Albriton Desideratum, and More Ontological Problems -- 4. Indexical Individuals and the Substantival Role of Indicators -- 5. The Ingenious Quasi-indexical Form of Attributions of Perception -- 6. The Informational Package of Terms in Quasi-indexical positions.

7. An Illuminating Counterexample Proposed by William Lycan -- Notes -- Chapter 7. Deliberation, Intentional Action, and Indexical Reference -- 1. Summary of Main Contentions -- 2. The Fundamental Indexicality of Practical Thinking -- 3. Attributions of Intention: Their Contextually Tacit Quasi-Indicator -- Notes -- Chapter 8. Personality, Anaphora, and Verbal Tenses -- 1. Split Personality and Anaphora: A Letter to Barbara Partee and Emmon Bach -- 2. Indexicality and Quasi-Indexicality in Verbal Tenses -- Notes -- Chapter 9. God and Knowledge: Omniscience and Indexical Reference -- 1. The Problem -- 2. Kretzmann's Argument and Quasi-Indicators -- 3. Knowledge of Change -- 4. Self-Knowledge -- 5. Omniscience and Omnipotence -- 6. Knowledge and Self: A Correspondence Between Robert M. Adams and Hector-Neri Castañeda -- Notes -- Chapter 10. Self and Reality: Metaphysical Internalism, Selves, and the Holistic Indivisible Noumenon -- 1. Modest Transcendental Realism: The Cogito, The Ballon, and The True -- 2. The Ontological Semantic Dimension of Ordinary Words -- 3. The Fivefold Ontological Dimensions of Certainty -- 4. Selves, I-guises, and the Multifarious Semiotics of First-Person Reference -- 5. The I-Manifold -- Strict Semantic Denotation versus Doxastic Denotation -- 6. The Variegated Sameness in the I-Network -- 7. The Transcendental Prefix and Experience -- Notes -- References -- Chapter 11. Fiction and Reality: Ontological Questions about Literary Experience -- 1. A Startling Case -- 2. The fundamental ontology of fiction -- 3. Some Criteria of Adequacy of Any Ontological Theory of Fiction -- 4. The Fictional Actual Ambiguity -- 5. Basic Ontological Theories of Fictional Truths -- 6. Theory (T1): Predicate Ambiguity -- 7. Theory (T2): Subject Ambiguity -- 8. Theory (T4): Story Operators.

9. Theory (T3): The Fictional/Actual Ambiguity As a Copula Ambiguity -- 10. Ontological Atoms of Individuation: Individual Guises -- 11. A Metaphysical Note -- 12. Theory of Predication -- 13. Possible Worlds -- 14. Conclusion -- Appendix -- Notes -- Chapter 12. The Language of Other Minds: Indicators and Quasi-Indicators -- 1. Purpose, Problem and Conventions -- 2. Indicators -- 3. Oo-Prefixes -- 4. Indicators in Oratio Obliqua -- 5. Quasi-Indicators -- 6. Unanalyzability of Strict Quasi-Indicators -- 7. Quasi-Indicators in N-Fold Oratio Obliqua -- 8. Notation for Quasi-Indicators -- Notes -- Part III. A Semantic and Ontological Theory for the Language of Experience: Guise Theory -- Chapter 13. Thinking and the Structure of the World -- Preface -- 1. Ontological Data and Problems -- 2. The Abstractist Ontology: Informal Presentation -- 3. Properties: A Metaphysical Glimpse -- 4. Conclusion -- Appendix -- Notes -- Chapter 14. Method, Individuals, and Guise Theory -- 1. Summary of Plantinga's Criticism of Guise Theory -- 2. Methodology: Data versus Theories: Theoretical Pluralism -- 3. Evidence for Guise Theory -- 4. Plantinga's Wedge between Identity and True-of -- 5. Things That Do Not Exist -- 6. Plantinga's Argument for the Alleged Fission of Guises -- 7. Plantinga's Fission Argument: The Importation of Improper Singular Terms and the Neglect of Oedipan Sieves -- 8. Plantinga's Fission Argument: The Importation into Guise Theory of an Inimical Asymmetric Aspect-of Relation -- 9. Internal Predication and Copulational Symmetry -- 10. Plantinga's Vicious Infinite Regress -- 11. Additional Forms of Predication -- 12. Copulas, Saturation, and Types of Property -- 13. Plantinga's Aristotelian Predication -- 14. Conclusion -- Notes -- Index -- Subject Index -- A -- B -- C -- D -- E -- F -- G -- H -- I -- K -- L -- M -- N -- O -- P -- Q -- R -- S -- T.

U -- V -- W -- Y -- Author Index -- A -- B -- C -- D -- E -- F -- G -- H -- I -- J -- K -- L -- M -- N -- O -- P -- Q -- R -- S -- T -- U -- W -- Z.