CONTENTS -- ABBREVIATIONS -- 1. INTRODUCTORY: EPISTEMOLOGY AND POLITICAL THEORY -- 1.1. Justificatory Liberalism -- 1.2. Moral Epistemology -- 1.3. Public and Personal Justification -- 1.4. Plan of the Book -- PART I-PERSONAL JUSTIFICATION -- 2. BELIEVING FOR REASONS -- 2.1. Giving, Having, and Believing for Reasons -- 2.2. Reasons as Causes of Beliefs -- 2.3. Sustaining Causes and Justified Belief -- 2.4. Efficient Causation and Justification -- 2.5. Are All Reasons for Beliefs Themselves Beliefs? -- 3. THE INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL PERSPECTIVES -- 3.1. Open and Closed Justification -- 3.2. Externalist Justifications -- 3.3. Belief Commitments and Tacit Beliefs -- 3.4. Relativism of Reasons -- 3.5. Relativism and Belief Systems -- 4. TAMING RELATIVISM -- 4.1. Why We Are Not Committed to Normative Cognitive Pluralism -- 4.2. Natural Mental Logic -- 4.3. Mutual Intelligibility and the Limits of Pluralism -- 4.4. Stich's Objection to the Bridgehead -- 4.5. Inferential Errors -- 4.6. Are the Subjects Really Wrong? -- 5. INFERENTIAL JUSTIFICATION -- 5.1. The Argument Thus Far -- 5.2. Four Axioms of Inferential Justification -- 5.3. Defeating Reasons -- 5.4. Epistemic Akrasia -- 6. WHY ALL JUSTIFICATION CANNOT BE PURELY INFERENTIAL -- 6.1. The Regress Argument -- 6.2. Global Coherentism -- 6.3. Inferential Justification and Web Coherentism -- 6.4. Conclusion: Coherence and Inference -- 7. FOUNDATIONALISM AND INTUITIONISM -- 7.1. Coherence Theories and Self-Justified Beliefs -- 7.2. Weak Foundationalism -- 7.3. Moral Intuitionism -- 7.4. Reflective Equilibrium -- 7.5. Summary of Part I -- PART II-PUBLIC JUSTIFICATION -- 8. PRIVATE, SOCIAL, AND PUBLIC REASONERS -- 8.1. Private Reasoners -- 8.2. Social Reasoners and Intersubjective Agreement -- 8.3. Why Reason Publicly? -- 8.4. Moral Demands and Moral Authority -- 8.5. Public Reason and Moral Demands.

9. WHAT IS PUBLIC JUSTIFICATION? -- 9.1. Populist Theories of Public Justification -- 9.2. Openly Justifiable Demands -- 9.3. Defeated and Victorious Justifications -- 9.4. Undefeated Justifications -- 10. LIBERAL PRINCIPLES -- 10.1. Victorious Justification: Constraints and Resources -- 10.2. Toleration, Free Speech, and the Commitment to Public Justification -- 10.3. Immunities as Defeated Proposals -- 10.4. The Public and Private -- 10.5. Why the Reflexivity Requirement Is Misguided -- 11. INCONCLUSIVE PUBLIC REASONING -- 11.1. Two Unacceptable Responses to Inconclusiveness -- 11.2. Liberal Authority -- PART III-POLITICAL JUSTIFICATION -- 12. THE RULE OF LAW -- 12.1. Three Aspects of the Rule of Law -- 12.2. The Internal Morality of Law -- 12.3. Rights -- 12.4. Constitutionalism -- 12.5. Liberal Constitutions and Constitutional Politics -- 13. TRACKING DESIDERATA FOR LAW-MAKING INSTITUTIONS -- 13.1. Law-Making Institutions -- 13.2. The Political Contract -- 13.3. Inconclusiveness, Indeterminacy, and Random Democracy -- 13.4. Widely Responsive Procedures -- 13.5. Deliberative Procedures -- 13.6. Non-Neutral Procedures -- 14. POLITICAL EQUALITY -- 14.1. The Limits of the Consequentialist Justification of Democracy -- 14.2. The Principle of Equality and Political Equality -- 14.3. On Political Inequality -- 15. CHALLENGES TO ADJUDICATIVE DEMOCRACY -- 15.1. The Challenge from Social Choice Theory -- 15.2. The Charge of Public Incompetence -- 15.3. Politics, Self-Interest, and Adjudication -- 15.4. Vote Trading -- 15.5. Adjudication versus Mediation -- 16. THE JUDICIARY AND THE LIMITS OF LEGISLATION -- 16.1. Judges as Umpires -- 16.2. Judicial Review -- 16.3. The Moral Obligation to Obey the Law and Its Limits -- 16.4. Revolution and Utopian Aspirations -- 17. CONCLUSION: JUSTIFICATORY LIBERALISM AND ITS RIVALS.

APPENDIX: LIBERAL PRINCIPLES IN A WORLD OF STATES -- NOTES -- BIBLIOGRAPHY -- INDEX -- A -- B -- C -- D -- E -- F -- G -- H -- I -- J -- K -- L -- M -- N -- O -- P -- Q -- R -- S -- T -- U -- V -- W.