PREFACE -- CONTENTS -- INTRODUCTION -- I. IMPROVING OUR ETHICAL BELIEFS -- 1. Piecemeal appeal to intuition -- 2. Purist views -- 3. Have we been too hard on intuitions? -- 4. The Coherence Theory -- 5. A coherence theory for ethics -- 6. What we need -- II. THE GOOD LIFE -- 1. The heterogeneity of values -- 2. Two models of value judgements -- 3. Which model? -- 4. A general profile of prudential values -- 5. Individual differences -- 6. Dubious dualisms -- III. THE BOUNDARIES OF THE NATURAL WORLD -- 1. Conceptual naturalism -- 2. Substantive naturalism -- 3. The supervenience relation -- 4. Are values supervenient? -- 5. Explanation by ascent -- IV. VALUE AND NATURE -- 1. The search for reliability -- 2. Can prudential judgements be 'correct'? -- 3. Are prudential values real? -- 4. Expanding the list of especially reliable beliefs -- V. A SIMPLE MORAL THOUGHT -- 1. A glance back -- 2. The line between prudence and morality -- 3. Egoism and altruism -- 4. An example of a moral standard -- 5. Deliberation about such a standard -- 6. Special reliability again -- 7. A look ahead -- VI. AGENTS -- 1. The good life -- 2. The limits of the will -- 3. The demands of social life -- 4. The limits of knowledge -- 5. Beyond common sense: philosophy and the search for system -- VII. SOME COMPLEX MORAL IDEAS -- 1. Where do moral norms come from? -- 2. Human limitations and the problem of scope -- 3. An objection -- 4. Other cases -- 5. The possibility of system: (a) utilitarianism -- 6. (b) Deontology -- 7. (c) Virtue ethics -- 8. My proposal -- 9. Ethical conservatism -- 10. The metaethical standing of these norms -- VIII. HOW CAN WE IMPROVE OUR ETHICAL BELIEFS? -- 1. The role of beliefs of high reliability -- 2. Stages in criticizing ethics -- 3. The idea of 'justifying' ethics -- 4. The stuff of reflection -- NOTES -- BIBLIOGRAPHY -- INDEX -- A -- B -- C.

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