CONTENTS -- CONFIRMATION AND RELEVANCE -- CARNAP'S EMPIRICISM -- BAYESIAN METHODS AND THE INITIAL PROBABILITIES OF THEORIES -- INDUCTION AND EMPIRICISM: A BAYESIAN-FREQUENTIST ALTERNATIVE -- SHIMONY'S A PRIORI ARGUMENTS FOR TEMPERED PERSONALISM -- VINDICATION: A REPLY TO PAUL TELLER -- THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL ROOTS OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE -- THE USES OF PROBABILITY AND THE CHOICE OF A REFERENCE CLASS -- INDUCTION, RATIONAL ACCEPTANCE, AND MINIMALLY INCONSISTENT SETS -- CONFIRMATION AND PARSIMONY -- COMMENTS ON "CONFIRMATION AND PARSIMONY'' -- REJOINDER TO PROFESSOR TELLER -- THE MEASURE OF ALL THINGS -- NAMES, RANDOM SAMPLES, AND CARNAP -- PRESUPPOSITIONS OF PROPENSITY THEORIES OF PROBABILITY -- POPPER'S PROPENSITY INTERPRETATION OF PROBABILITY AND QUANTUM MECHANICS -- THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INFERENCE AND EXPECTATION: SOME PRELIMINARY REMARKS -- MACH'S PRINCIPLE AND THE LAWS OF LOGIC -- PHYSICAL LAWS AND THE NATURE OF PHILOSOPHICAL REDUCTION -- PARADOXES OF COSMOLOGICAL SELF-REFERENCE -- INDEXES -- NAME INDEX -- A -- B -- C -- D -- E -- F -- G -- H -- J -- K -- L -- M -- N -- O -- P -- Q -- R -- S -- T -- U -- V -- W -- Z -- SUBJECT INDEX -- A -- B -- C -- D -- E -- F -- G -- H -- I -- J -- K -- L -- M -- N -- O -- P -- Q -- R -- S -- T -- U -- V -- W.