Cover -- Title Page -- Copyright -- Preface -- Contents -- Figures -- Tables -- Summary -- Acknowledgments -- Abbreviations -- Chapter One: Introduction -- Chapter Two: Highlights of the Campaign -- Initial Reliance on Standoff Attacks -- The Standoff War Continues -- First Signs of Emerging Doubt -- The Move to Ground Operations -- Countdown to a Ceasefire -- An Inconclusive Ending -- Chapter Three: Key Israeli Air Accomplishments -- Sustaining a New Battle Rhythm -- Defusing the Strategic Rocket Threat -- UAV Operations -- Airlift and CSAR Support -- The Ababil Downings -- Chapter Four: Problems in Air Employment -- The Intractable Katyusha Challenge -- Failed Attempts Against Hezbollah's Leaders -- A Polarizing Incidence of Noncombatant Fatalities -- Overkill of Lebanon's Infrastructure -- Issues in Air-Ground Coordination -- Chapter Five: The Winograd Commission's Findings -- On the IDF's Combat Performance -- On the Olmert Government's Errors in Strategy -- On Assessed Leadership Failings -- Chapter Six: A Second Chance in Gaza -- Getting Ready for the Next Round -- An Improved Showing Against Hamas -- Highlights of the Joint Operation -- Where Israel Got It Right This Time -- Chapter Seven: The Second Lebanon War Reconsidered -- Air Power in IDF Doctrine and Operational Practice -- Explaining the Government's Strategy Choice -- The Genesis and Execution of the Strategy -- Where the Strategy Failed to Deliver -- Was the Campaign Really a Lost Cause for Israel? -- Chapter Eight: Conclusions -- Bibliography -- Index.